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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
ISSUE I: WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT 
THERE WAS NO GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT 
CONCERNING WHETHER OR NOT PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT 
WATTERS WAS AN EMPLOYEE OF DEFENDANTS AND 
APPELLEES. 
ISSUE II: WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT 
THERE WAS NO GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT 
CONCERNING MESA VISTA'S LICENSURE. 
ISSUE III: WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY 
REFUSING TO GRANT PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT'S MOTION 
FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT WHICH MOTION IS BASED 
UPON PLAINTIFF'S COUNSELS FAILURE TO TIMELY FOLLOW 
THE RULES OF PROCEDURE RELATING TO SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT MOTIONS. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: See Brief of Appellant at 1-2. 
2 
STATUTES OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE TO THIS APPEAL 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 12(b): 
"(b) How presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to 
claim for relief in any pleading, whether a claim, 
counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall 
be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one 
is required, except that the following defenses may at 
the option of the pleader be made by motion: (1) lack 
of jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) lack of 
jurisdiction over the person, (3) improper venue, (4) 
insufficiency of process, (5) insufficiency of service 
of process, (6) failure to state a claim upon which 
relief can be granted, (7) failure to join an 
indispensable party. A motion making any of these 
defenses shall be made before pleading if a further 
pleading is permitted. No defense or objection is 
waived by being joined with one or more other defenses 
or objections in a responsive pleading or motion or by 
further pleading after the denial of such motion or 
objection. If a pleading sets forth a claim for relief 
to which the adverse party is not required to serve a 
responsive pleading, he may assert at the trial any 
defense in law or fact to that claim for relief. If, 
on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to 
dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim 
upon relief can be granted, matters outside the 
pleading are presented to and not excluded by the 
court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary 
judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and 
all parties shall be give reasonable opportunity to 
present all materials made pertinent to such a motion 
by Rule 56." 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56(c) and (e): 
"(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall 
be served at least 10 days before the time fixed for 
the hearing. The adverse party prior to the day of 
hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment 
sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions 
on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show 
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as 
a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in 
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability 
alone although there is a genuine issue as to the 
amount of damages. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense 
required. Supporting and opposing further affidavits 
shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth 
such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and hall 
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show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to 
testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or 
certified copies of all papers or parts thereof 
referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto 
or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits 
to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers 
to interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a 
motion for summary judgment is made and supported as 
provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest 
upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, 
but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise 
provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts 
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he 
does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, 
shall be entered against him." 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 60(b): 
"(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly 
discovered evidence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon 
such terms as are just, the court may in the 
furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal 
representative from a final judgment, order, or 
proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly 
discovered evidence which by due diligence could not 
have been discovered in time to move for a new trial 
under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore 
denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation 
or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) when, for 
any cause, the summons in any action has not been 
personally served upon the defendant as required by 
Rule 4(e) and the defendant has failed to appear in 
said action; (5) the judgment is void; (6) the judgment 
has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior 
judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or 
otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that 
the judgment should have prospective application; or 
(7) any other reason justifying relief from the 
operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made 
within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), (3), 
or (4), not more than 3 months after the judgment, 
order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion 
under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality 
of a judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does 
not limited the power of the court to entertain an 
independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, 
or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon 
the court. The procedure for obtaining any relief from 
a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these 
rules or by an independent action. 
Utah Administrative Code section R432-100-2.201(A) provides 
"Licenses Required. No person or governmental 
4 
unit acting severally or jointly with any other 
personf or governmental unit shall establish, 
conduct, or maintain a health facility in this 
state without first obtaining a license from 
the department•" 
Utah Administrative Code section R432-100-2.203(B) provides 
that 
"Upon verification of compliance with 
licensing requirements the Department shall 
issue a provisional license." 
Finally, Utah Administrative Code section R432-100-2.204(B) 
provides 
"Non-transferable. The license shall 
be issued only to the licensee and for 
the premises described in the application 
and shall not be assignable or transferable." 
5 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE, 
This case was filed by plaintiff and appellant (hereafter 
"APPELLANT") for constructive discharge, wrongful constructive 
discharge, breach of employment contract, breach of insurance 
contract, wrongful refusal to pay insurance claims, and 
conversion. 
The defendants and appellees took over the facility after 
appellant had quit working. Appellant has since filed suit 
against her employers in an action naming Vali Division of 
Wasatch, Inc., appellant's true employer, as a defendant. See 
Watters v. Allred, et al. Case No. 930400568. Appellant has also 
named appellee Allred as a defendant in the new suit as an 
employee of Vali Division of Wasatch.1 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS. 
Appellant filed her original verified complaint on January 
14, 1993.2 On July 7, 1993, plaintiff filed an amended 
complaint.3 On July 15, 1993, defendants and appellees KAREN 
ALLRED, et al., (hereinafter "APPELLEES") filed their motion to 
dismiss based upon Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 12(b)(6).4 
In opposition to defendant's motion to dismiss, appellant filed 
an objection and submitted extensive evidentiary materials, 
including the declaration of appellant and two (2) other 
2Mesa Vista, Inc. is not named as a defendant in this 
action. 
2Record at 10. 
3Record at 41. 
4Record at 68. 
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individuals.5 On September 23, 1993f appellees filed their 
Response to Plaintiff's Objection to Defendants' Motion to 
Dismiss and Request to Convert to Motion for Summary Judgment 
[Rule URCP 12B(b)].6 Appellees also submitted the Declaration of 
Karen A. Allred with attached exhibits in support of defendants' 
motion for summary judgment.7 On September 30, 1993, appellant's 
counsel filed a request for oral argument on defendants' Motion 
for Summary Judgment.8 Appellant filed no opposition to 
defendants' motion for summary judgment and submitted no 
affidavits which were responsive to the factual assertions of 
appellees.9 
On November 5, 1993, Judge Park entered an order which 
stated in relevant part as follows: 
"1. Defendants' motion to dismiss, now converted to 
motion for summary judgment is set on December 14 , 
1993, at 8:15 a.m."10 
The November 5, 1993 order also set for hearing appellant's 
5Record at 177. 
6Record at 190. 
7Record at 230. 
8Record at 238. It is important to note that appellant 
filed a request for hearing on defendants' motion for 
summary judgment on September 30, 1993, yet later, claimed 
to have been "some what confused" as to what the nature of 
the proceedings was. See Hearing Transcript at 5, line 25 
thru 6, line 3. 
9As of this writing, appellant has still not claimed she was 
ever employed by appellees. In that appellant was not 
employed by appellees, a claim for wrongful discharge will 
not lie against appellees. 
10Record at 315. Once again appellant's counsel was 
notified of the nature of the proceedings yet feigned 
confusion at the hearing. 
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motion to file a second amended complaint. 
On December 14, 1993, the hearing on the above matters was 
held and the court, after hearing extensive argument from both 
parties, granted defendants' motion for summary judgment. At the 
hearing on December 14 , 1993, appellant's counsel, Ms. Marti 
Jones, informed the court that the motion to file a second 
amended complaint had been withdrawn. In particular, Mr. Jones 
stated to the court: 
"MS. JONES: Your Honor, that motion has been withdrawn. 
It was withdrawn yesterday... 
THE COURT: Have you filed a document? 
MS. JONES: We filed a notice of withdraw with that 
motion. 
THE COURT: When did you file that? 
MS. JONES: Yesterday."11 
In fact, at the time that Ms. Jones made these statements 
they were false and were known by Ms. Jones to be false. As the 
record reflects, the notice of withdrawal of plaintiffs motion 
to file a second amended complaint was not filed on December 13, 
1993, but was filed with the court on December 14, 1993, at 1:36 
p.m., after the hearing before Judge Park. 
On December 14, 1993, appellees' counsel prepared a proposed 
judgment as ordered by the court.12 
On or about December 28, 1993, appellant filed a motion for 
reconsideration with points and authorities in support thereof.13 
xlTranscript of proceedings 2-3. 
12Record at 328. 
13Record at 334. 
8 
In addition, appellant filed the affidavit of attorney and an 
affidavit of Lee Bangerter.14 
On January 3, 1994, Judge Boyd Park signed the order 
granting appellees' motion for summary judgment,15 
On January 7, 1994, appellant filed their Opposition to 
Motion for Reconsideration; Declaration of Karen Widman; and 
Request for Sanctions.16 
On January 13, 1994, appellant filed a notice of withdrawal 
of appellant's Motion for Reconsideration and filed an additional 
motion titled Motion to Set Aside Summary Judgment.17 
On January 25, 1994, appellees filed their Opposition to 
Motion to Set Aside Summary Judgment; Declaration of Karen 
Widman; and Request for Sanctions.18 
On or about February 2, 1994, appellant filed her Response 
to Defendants' Objection to Plaintiff's Motion to Set Aside 
Summary Judgment.19 On February 3, 1994, appellant filed her 
Notice of Appeal.20 
On February 25, 1994, Judge Park entered his ruling which 
denied appellant's motion to set aside summary judgment.21 
14Record at 337 and 339. 
15Record at 342. 
16Record at 381. 
17Record at 437. 
18Record at 482. 
19Record at 493. 
20Record at 494. 
21Record at 497. 
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On March 3, 1994, appellant filed a motion to extend the 
filing time for appeal nunc pro tunc.22 This motion was 
necessitated because appellant had failed to timely file her 
notice of appeal. Appellee filed an opposition and on March 22, 
1994, Judge Park entered a ruling which stated in its findings 
and ruling the following: 
"1. This case is fraught with untimeliness by the 
Plaintiff, resulting in Defendants7 Motion for Rule 11 
Sanctions. 
.... 
4. The court signed its Order granting Defendants' 
Summary Judgment on January 3, 1994. 
5. Plaintiff filed a notice of appeal on February 3, 
1994, 31 days after the signing of the court's Summary 
Judgment Order. "23 
C. DISPOSITION IN THE TRIAL COURT. 
Judge Park orally granted appellees' motion for summary 
judgment on December 14, 1993. Judge Park signed the judgment on 
January 3, 1994. The trial court denied appellant's motion to 
set aside summary judgment. Findings of fact are not authorized 
with relationship to the granting of a motion for summary 
judgment. 
The trial court granted appellant's motion nunc pro tunc to 
extend the time to file an appeal by one (1) day. 
D. STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
Appellant has set forth fourteen (14) facts which are 
alleged to be undisputed because appellant asserts that the 
statement of facts by the party in opposition to summary judgment 
22Record at 513. 
23Record at 527-528. 
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must be taken as truth. This is not an accurate statement of 
law. The motion below was a motion for summary judgment. In 
that motion it was established that there were no material issues 
of fact in dispute. Therefore, the only facts which are relevant 
are those facts which were demonstrated not to be in dispute and 
which entitled appellees to judgment as a matter of law. As set 
forth belowf these are the facts which were not disputed and 
which are relevant to the instant appeal. 
1. On March 22, 1991, appellant was employed by LakeCrest 
Development Center.24 
2. On March 18, 1992, appellant was immediately and 
summarily suspended from her job on the basis of three (3) 
complaints of abuse of clients.25 
3. Appellant quit her job on March 23, 1992.26 
4. On or about March 18, 1992, an application was filed on 
behalf of Mesa Vista to operate an intermediate care facility for 
the mentally retarded (ICF/MR) with the Bureau of Health Facility 
Licensure State of Utah. This application was approved by the 
Bureau effective March 25, 1992.27 
5. Mesa Vista took over operation of the facility on April 
1, 1992.28 
24Record at 40f paragraph 9; Record at 228 (Declaration of 
Karen Allred). 
25Record at 39 , paragraphs 16, 17, 18. 
26Record at 38, paragraph 22 and 23. 
27Record at 188; Record at 229 (Declaration of Karen 
Allred). 
28Record at 187 through 188; Record at 229 (Declaration of 
Karen Allred). 
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6. Prior to April lf 1992, Mesa Vista was not the owner, 
operator, and had no right of entry into the facility.29 
7. Appellant Sue Ellen Watters was never employed by, nor 
an employee of, Mesa Vista, Inc., and never worked for Mesa 
Vista, Inc. Ms. Watters was never on Mesa Vista's payroll and 
never received a paycheck from Mesa Vista, Inc.30 
8. Karen A. Allred was never an officer or director of Vali 
Division of Wasatch, LakeCrest Developmental Center, or Rocky 
Mountain Health Care. Each of these entities were the managers 
or operators of the facility at the time that Sue Ellen Watters 
was employed at LakeCrest.31 
9. The court should note that fact number 14 asserted by 
appellant is not supported by the record. In fact, appellant was 
suspended on March 23, 1992. This fact appears from her verified 
complaint.32 
29Record at 187 through 188; Record at 229 (Declaration of 
Karen Allred). 
30Record at 187 through 188; Record at 228, Paragraph 5 
(Declaration of Karen Allred). 
31Record at 187 through 188; Record at 229 and 228. 
32Record at 38, paragraphs 20 through 23. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Summary judgment is appropriate if the trial court finds 
that "the pleadings, depositionf answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show 
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that 
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56(c). As a preliminary 
matter, appellant never has alleged that she was employed in any 
capacity by Mesa Vista, Inc. or Karen Allred as executive 
director of Mesa Vista Inc. As set forth below, appellant failed 
to raise any material issue of fact either through papers in 
opposition to appellee's motion for summary judgment or at oral 
argument before the trial court. Thus, it was appropriate for 
the trial court to grant summary judgment. 
In her brief, appellant asserts that who controlled the 
facility raised a material issue of fact to be tried.33 
However, appellant concedes that it is undisputed that 
appellee, Mesa Vista, was not licensed to operate the facility 
until after appellant quit her job. This admission, along with 
the undisputed facts that appellant was never employed by Mesa 
Vista, dictates but one result, affirmance of the trial court's 
judgment. 
The second prong of appellant's attack is as to the trial 
court's denial of appellant's motion for relief pursuant to Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 60(b). Appellant moved the court 
for relief under Rule 60(b) on the grounds of excusable neglect 
33Brief of Appellant at 11-16. 
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and alleged fraud.34 As will be set forth below, it was not an 
abuse of discretion for the trial court to deny appellant's 
motion in that an attorney's failure to file an opposition to a 
motion for summary judgment and to comply with procedural rules 
does not rise to the level of excusable neglect. The trial court 
did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion pursuant to 
Rule 60(b). 
34Appellant has abandoned her allegations of fraud. See 
Brief of Appellant at 9, note 4. 
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ARGUMENT 
I 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPERLY GRANTED IN FAVOR OF APPELLEES 
IN THAT APPELLANT WAS NEVER AN EMPLOYEE OF APPELLEE 
This case revolves around an alleged wrongful termination of 
employment. The appellees, Mesa Vista, Inc. and Karen A. Allred, 
as executive director of Mesa Vista, Inc.f have maintained since 
the filing of their motion to dismiss that appellant was never an 
employee of Mesa Vista and that Mesa Vista and Karen Allred have 
no corporate connection to appellant's employers, Vali Division 
of Wasatch, LakeCrest Developmental Center, or Rocky Mountain 
Health Care.35 As is fully set forth below, appellant Watters 
has consistently conceded that she was never an employee of Mesa 
Vista, Inc., never worked for Mesa Vista, Inc., was never paid by 
Mesa Vista, Inc. and was never on Mesa Vista, Inc.'s payroll. In 
short, as a matter of law, appellant was never an employee of 
Mesa Vista, Inc., and thus has no claim against these appellees. 
On appeal herein, appellant still does not claim that she 
was ever an employee of Mesa Vista, Inc., but rather argues that 
the issue of when Mesa Vista, Inc. took over operation of the 
facility is the crucial issue in determining whether or not 
summary judgment was properly granted. 
From the beginning, appellees Mesa Vista, Inc. and Karen 
Allred, as executive director of Mesa Vista, Inc., have 
maintained that although appellant may have a colorable claim for 
alleged wrongful discharge, such claim must be brought against 
35Karen Allred was employed by Vali Division of 
Wasatch/Rocky Mountain Health Care as the Administrator of 
the LakeCrest Development Center up to April 1, 1992. 
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parties other than Mesa Vista and Karen Allred as Executive 
Director of Mesa Vista.36 In fact, the trial court in granting 
the motion for summary judgment stated to appellant that by 
granting the motion the way it did "that will leave you free to 
bring your lawsuit again against Karen Allred, as acting 
administrator and get the proper parties before the court."37 
In appellees' request to convert their motion to dismiss 
into one for summary judgmentf appellees specifically informed 
appellant that "the garvenman of this Motion is that plaintiff 
Sue Ellen Watters has sued the wrong parties."38 Appellees set 
forth specific facts which appellees claimed were material, and 
were not disputed. The following facts were set forth by 
appellees: 
"1. Mesa Vista, Inc. is a Utah Corporation. 
2. At the time of Mesa Vista's incorporation, Karen A. 
Allred was neither an officer or director of such 
corporation. See Declaration of Karen A. Allred at 1, 
paragraph 2. 
3. On or about March 18, 1992, an application was 
filed on behalf of Mesa Vista to operate an 
intermediate care facility for the mentally retarded 
(ICF/MR) with the Bureau of Heath Facility Licensure 
State of Utah. This application was approved by the 
Bureau effective March 25, 1992. See Declaration of 
Karen A. Allred at 2, paragraph 3. 
4. Mesa Vista took over operation of the facility on 
April 1, 1992. 
5. Prior to April 1, 1992, Mesa Vista was not the 
owner, operator, and had no right of entry into the 
facility. See Declaration of Karen A. Allred at 2f 
36This court should note that appellant quit her employment. 
She was not fired or otherwise terminated. 
37Hearing transcript at 16:lines 6-8. 
38Record at 190. 
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paragraph 4. 
6. Plaintiff Sue Ellen Watters was never employed by, 
nor an employee of, Mesa Vista, Inc., and never worked 
for Mesa Vista, Inc. Ms. Watters was never on Mesa 
Vista's payroll and never received a paycheck from Mesa 
Vista, Inc. See Declaration of Karen A. Allred at 3, 
paragraph 5. 
7. Karen A. Allred was never an officer or director of 
Vali Division of Wasatch, LakeCrest Developmental 
Center, or Rocky Mountain Health Care. Each of these 
entities were the managers or operators of the facility 
at the time that Sue Ellen Watters was employed at 
LakeCrest. See Declaration of Karen A. Allred at 2, 
paragraph 4; and at 3, paragraph 6."39 
Each of the above facts were supported by competent 
evidence. For her part, appellant filed no opposition to the 
motion for summary judgment. The declaration filed in opposition 
to the motion to dismiss did not address or dispute any of the 
material facts set forth by appellee. Based upon the undisputed 
set of facts before Judge Park at the time that he entered 
judgment, it is clear that appellant, in fact, sued the wrong 
parties. 
This case is for wrongful termination of appellant's 
employment. As such, appellant would be required to prove at the 
time of trial that appellant, in fact, was employed by Mesa 
Vista, Inc.40 It is established in this record, that appellant 
was never employed by Mesa Vista, Inc. To date, appellant has 
never tried to deny that she was never an employee of or employed 
by Mesa Vista, Inc. in any capacity whatsoever. The only 
evidence in the record from appellant is that she was employed by 
39Record at 187 through 188. 
40See e.g. Johnson v. Morton Thiokol, Inc., 818 Pac.2d 997 
(Utah 1991); see also, Berube v. Fashion Center, Ltd., 771 
Pac.2d 1033 (Utah 1989). 
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Rocky Mountain Health Care41 or LakeCrest Development Center42, or 
Vali Division of Wasatch43. Nowhere has appellant attempted to 
submit any evidence which demonstrated that she was ever employed 
by Mesa Vista, Inc. Nowhere does appellant attempt to assert 
that she was ever an employee of Mesa Vistaf Inc. In shortf 
appellant has never produced any evidence of any nature 
whatsoever in this proceeding to support a finding that she was 
employed by or an employee of Mesa Vista, Inc. The only 
conclusion that could be reached by the trial court was that 
there was no employer-employee relationship between appellant and 
appellee and thus the granting of summary judgment on this basis 
alone was correct. 
II 
THERE IS NO TRIABLE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT 
REGARDING MESA VISTA'S LICENSURE 
As she did in the trial court below, appellant before this 
court contends that there is "manifest confusion" as to what 
occurred.44 Appellant asserts that although it is undisputed 
that Mesa Vista was not licensed to operate the facility until 
the earliest March 25, 199245 there was evidence in the record to 
41See Affidavit of Sue Ellen Watters, Record at 402. 
42Record at 9, paragraph 40. 
43Brief of Appellant at 4. 
44In fact, the basis for appellant's counsels failure to 
file an opposition to the motion for summary judgment is 
based upon her confessed confusion as to what she is 
required to do procedurally. This confusion alibi has been 
rejected by the trial court and should be rejected by this 
court. 
45Brief of Appellant at 12. 
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show that Mesa Vista was in "actual physical and administrative 
control of the facility on March 18, 1992".46 The facts asserted 
however, do not rise to the level of creating a genuine issue of 
material fact. 
Appellee submitted that the following facts were not in 
dispute: 
"3. On or about March 18, 1992, an application was 
filed on behalf of Mesa Vista to operate an 
intermediate care facility for the mentally retarded 
(ICF/MR) with the Bureau of Heath Facility Licensure 
State of Utah. This application was approved by the 
Bureau effective March 25, 1992. See Declaration of 
Karen A. Allred at 2, paragraph 3. 
4. Mesa Vista took over operation of the facility on 
April 1, 1992. 
5. Prior to April 1, 1992, Mesa Vista was not the 
owner, operator, and had no right of entry into the 
facility. See Declaration of Karen A. Allred at 2, 
paragraph 4." 
With regard to the above facts appellant again submitted no 
evidence to refute the undisputed facts that Mesa Vista was not 
licensed by the Bureau of Health Facility Licensure, State of 
Utah, until the earliest March 25, 1992, and that Mesa Vista took 
over operation of the facility pursuant to such license on April 
1, 1992. On the other side of the ledger, appellee submitted 
the license application47, and the response of the State of Utah 
dated March 25, 1992, titled "Notice of Decision-Initial License 
Approval".48 With regard to this later document, the license 
approval was not mailed until March 30, 1992, thus, the operative 
46Brief of Appellant at 12. 
47See Record at 230, Exhibit 1. 
48Record at 230, Exhibit 2. 
19 
date of April 1, 1992. Whether the operative date is March 25, 
1992f or April lf 1992f is irrelevant in that appellant quit her 
job on March 23, 1992.49 
As a matter of law, in the State of Utah, Mesa Vista could 
not conduct or maintain a health facility without first obtaining 
a license. 
Based upon the above authority, it is clear that as a matter 
of law, Mesa Vista could not conduct business at the facility 
until the earliest, March 25, 1992. Thus, as a matter of law, 
the trial court was correct50. 
Based upon the fact that appellant was never employed by the 
appellees and that the appellees could not, as a matter of law, 
conduct business or operate the facility until after being 
licensed by the State of Utah, it is respectfully submitted that 
the trial court appropriately granted summary judgment in 
appellees favor. 
Ill 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING 
APPELLANT'S MOTION BASED UPON EXCUSABLE NEGLECT 
The original motion under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
Rule 60(b), was based upon excusable neglect of the attorney and 
alleged fraud. Through the filing of appellant's brief, 
appellant has formerly abandoned any appeal with relationship to 
49Record at 38, paragraph 20-23. 
50Plaintiff's argument that the licensing of Mesa Vista may 
be a condition subsequent to the operation of the facility 
is nonsense. Mesa Vista's predecessor was required to 
continue operating the facility under Utah Administrative 
Code section R432-100-2.204(B) and Mesa Vista could not 
operate the facility "without first obtaining a license". 
Utah Administrative Code section R432-100-2.201(A). 
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the prior allegation of fraud. In particular, appellant states 
that page 19, footnote 4, "Appellant is unwilling to argue this 
ground now... ." 
Thus this court must review the Rule 60(b) simply for 
excusable neglect. Appellant's Rule 60(b) motion was essentially 
based upon appellant's counsels assertion that the reason she 
didn't file an opposition to the motion for summary judgment was 
that she was "confused" as to what procedural methodology she was 
to follow in opposing the summary judgment motion. Appellant's 
counsel also claims that she was unaware of what had occurred. 
In particular, appellant's counsel told the trial court 
"MS. JONES: I am afraid, Your Honor, that I am 
somewhat confused on this issue. We in essence must 
have, I frankly probably misinterrupted what counsel 
for the plaintiff or for the defendants were attempting 
to do. I have no objection to the Motion to Convert to 
a Summary Judgment, but I would, was unaware that there 
was additional evidence or objection necessary to the 
summary judgment a part from our Objections to their 
Motion to Dismiss. I think that the facts are there in 
the record. "51 
Rule 60(b) provides that a court may relieve a party from a 
final judgment or order if there is excusable neglect. In the 
instance case, the alleged neglect is appellant's counsels 
failure to file affidavits or other evidence in opposition to 
appellees' motion for summary judgment. The "excuse" for this 
neglect is appellant's counsels feigned confusion as to what to 
do. 
Appellant's counsel was aware from the beginning of what was 
occurring with relationship to the instant motion for summary 
judgment. On November 5, 1993, the trial court entered an order 
51Transcript at 5, line 25 through 6: line 8. 
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setting "defendant's motion to dismiss, now converted to motion 
for summary judgment" for hearing.52 On September 30, 1993f 
appellant's counsel filed a Request for Oral Argument on 
appellees' "Motion for Summary Judgment".53 In short, 
appellant's counsel knew that the proceeding was one for summary 
judgment. 
Appellant's counsel knew that under Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, Rule 12(b), the filing of "matters outside the 
pleading" in support of a motion pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), 
converted the motion to "one for summary judgment" which was to 
be disposed of as provided in Rule 56". Appellant's counsel is 
also aware that she was to be given "reasonable opportunity to 
present all materials made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 
56". Pursuant to Rule 56(c) and (e), the proceedings on a motion 
for summary judgment are set forth with particularity. 
Appellant's counsel is aware of this rule. 
Up to this point, appellant's counsel has failed in all 
respects to explain how her confusion over what was happening 
could rise to the level of excusable neglect. In short, the 
trial court did not abuse its discretion. 
Further, what appellant's counsel attempts to do is to 
submit new evidence not presented to the trial court at the time 
of hearing the motion for summary judgment. Rule 60(b) is quite 
explicit in this regard when it states that a motion to be 
relieved from an order may be granted based upon "newly 
"Record at 315. 
53Record at 238. 
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discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been 
discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b)". If 
appellant is asserting this a as basis for submitting new 
evidence, it is clear that appellant's counsel has never claimed 
that this evidence could not have been introduced prior to the 
hearing on the motion for summary judgment. Further, pursuant to 
Rule 56, if there are affidavits which could be solicited but 
were not available at the time of the filing of the motion, there 
is a procedure for appellant to request the trial court to give 
her an opportunity to gather such affidavits. This was not done. 
Based upon the foregoing, it is clear that the trial court 
did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's counsels 
motion pursuant to Rule 60(b). 
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CONCLUSION 
Appellant's suit was brought against Mesa Vista, Inc. and 
Karen Allred as executive director of Mesa Vistaf Inc. 
Appellees' motion to dismiss which was converted to one for 
summary judgment was essentially brought because appellant had 
sued the wrong party. In particular, during the period of time 
that appellant was employed, she was employed by LakeCrest 
Developmental Center and/or Vali Division of Wasatchf and/or 
Rocky Mountain Health Care. These appellees have no connection 
to these entities. 
It is conclusively established in this record that appellant 
was employed by someone other than Mesa Vista, Inc. It is 
undisputed by appellant that Mesa Vista, Inc. and Karen Allred as 
executive director of Mesa Vista, have no connection to Vali 
Division of Wasatch, Rocky Mountain Health Care or LakeCrest 
Developmental Center. It is also established in this record that 
on March 18, 1992, appellant was suspended from her job without 
pay. It is also undisputed that on March 23, 1992, appellant 
terminated her employment by quitting. 
Finally, it is undisputed that the State of Utah, Bureau of 
Health Facility Licensure, issued an operator's license to Mesa 
Vista authorizing Mesa Vista to operate the intermediate care 
facility for the mentally retarded. 
Based upon the above facts it is clear that appellant was 
never employed by nor an employee of Mesa Vista, Inc. Appellant 
did not submit any evidence to the trial court or to this court 
which would dispute this fact. It is clear that as a matter of 
law, Mesa Vista, Inc. could not have been operating the facility 
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until licensed to do so by the State of Utah. It is undisputed 
by the parties that this authority from the State of Utah was 
provided at the earliest on March 25, 1992, after appellant quit 
her employment with LakeCrest Development Center. It is equally 
clear that Vali Division of Wasatch dba LakeCrest Developmental 
Center, as the licensed operator of the facility is the proper 
party to sue.54 
Dated: 12-2-94 BLATTER AND FIELDING 
Ron Fielding 
LAW OFFICES OF DAVID M. SHELL 
David M. Shell 
Jeanine K. Clasen 
By: y 
David M. Shell 
Attorney for Defendants and 
Appellees 
54In fact, appellant has filed suit against Vali Division of 
Wasatch. See Watters vs. Allred, et al. Case No. 930400658 
filed on December 14, 1993. 
25 
Addenda 
SUE ELLEN WAITERS J 
1 I ]N THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY' •»'.•. ?1 
2 . 
STATE OF UTAH 
3 | * * * 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 | _
 ) Civil No. 930400021 
HEARING TRANSCRIPT 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
1 8
 BE IT REMEMBERED t h a t on Tuesday tne 14th day o f December, 
1 9
 1993, the HEARING in the above-ent i t led matter was taken by Richard C. 
20 Tatton, a Ce r t i f i ed Snortnand Reporter and Notary Public i n and for tne 
21 | State of Utah before the Honorable Boyd L. Park at the Fourth Judic ia l 
22 I D i s t r i c t Court Bu i ld ing , Provo, Utah. 
23 
24 
25 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KAREN ALLRED and MESA 
VISTA INC. 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
\ 
J 
) 
) 
A P P E A R A N C E S 
For the P l a i n t i f f : Mr. David Shell 
Attorney at Law 
428 J St reet , Suite 420 
Sacramento, Ca l i fo rn ia 95814 
Mr. Gary L. B la t te r 
Attorney at Law 
1113 South Orem Blvd. 
Orem, Utah 84058 
For the Defendants: Ms. Marti Jones 
Attorney at Law 
Provo, Utah 84601 
PR 0. C. £ £ D I IN G £ 
THE COURT: This is the time set for Oral Argument in the 
matter of'Sue Ellen Watters the Plaintiff vs. Karen All red and Mesa Verde 
Inc. 
Two motions are before the court. We have Defendants' Motion to 
Dismiss, now converted to a Motion for Summary Judgment and Plaintiff's 
Motion for filing a second amended complaint. 
MS. JONES: Your Honor, that motion has been withdrawn. It 
was withdrawn yesterday . J have got copies here, Your Honor. 
? 
THE COURT: It has been withdrawn? 
MS. JONES: Yes. J was not aware of local counsel or I would 
have served them yesterday. 
In light of their response, J have determined that there is 
probably some procedure irregularities. Furthermore, there is a strong 
possibility that we may need to file an additional amended complaint as 
per some of their objections. It just would make more sense, at this 
point to me, to withdraw that and hold that with the view to possibly 
making some amendments after the order of dismissal or after ihe 
discussion today. 
THE COURT: Have you filed a document? 
MS. JONES: We filed a notice of withdrawal with that motion. 
THE COURT: When did you file that? 
MS. JONES: Yesterday. 
THE COURT: All right. It hasn't hit the file so I am 
not aware of it. All we have in front of us is a Motion for Summary 
Judgment. It is defendants' motion and counsel we have, Mr. Shell are 
you here? 
MR. SHELL: Yes, Your Honor. Also with me is Mr. Blatter 
who is local counsel. We filed an association of attorneys yesterday for 
Mr. Blotter. 
THE COURT: That is not in the file either. I think I mentione) 
it that you need to have some counsel here. 
MR. SHELL: May I approach the bailiff, Your Honor? 
THE COURT: Yes, you may. 
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MR. SHELL: The conformed copy of the associat ion that was 
f i led yesterday. 
THE COURT: Okay. You may proceed Mr. She l l . 
MR. SHELL: My presentation w i l l be b r i e f fo r two reasons, 
Your Honor. F i r s t I bel ieve our papers sets out the essent ial 
facts which i f uncontested would require tha t Summary Judgment be granted 
as to the defendants, we f i l e d a summary judgment motion as t o . What 
] would l i k e to do i s proceed and - -
THE COURT: Why don' t you come up ^ere to the l ec te rn . 
MR. SHELL: Okay. 
THE COURT: Or do you need all those documents that you have 
got scattered out there. 
MR. SHELL: If I need something in addition, Your Honor, I will 
go back and get it. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. SHELL: As the court will recall, initially it was a Motion 
to Dismiss on the original complaint that was filed . It was 
in opposition to that motion, thit the plaintiff filed significant 
evidence. Then pursuant to the rules that govern this motion, we 
requested that it be converted to a Motion for Summary Judgment. We 
filed with the court a document styled our response to their 
objections and then our request to convert to Summary Judgment which at 
Page 3, after we had made the request to convert , we begain with our 
statement of undisputed facts. 
We submitted a memorandum in support of that motion. We submitted 
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1 to the court the Declaration of Karen A. All red which contained 
2 additional evidence for the court to consider. 
3 The reason I bring this to the court's attention is that we have 
4 received in the mails and I have checked with the clerk downstairs, there 
5 has not been filed any opposition to our Motion to convert to Summary 
6 Judgment or to the Motion for Summary Judgment itself. 
7 THE COURT: I didn't find one either. 
8 MR. SHELL: i read the Code of Judicial Administration Rule 
9 relating to Summary Judgment and I have read the Utah Rules of Civil 
10 Procedure, and they all indicate that if a motion is unopposed, as 
11 this one is, that it must be granted. 
12 Even taking the worst case scenario for our client that you could 
13 consider the opposition to the Motion to Dismiss as an opposition to 
14 Summary Judgment, there is no evidence presented in there, at all, 
15 concerning the undisputed facts regarding Mesa Vista, Karen Allred 
16 which are set forth beginning at Page 3 of our reply and our Motion to 
17 Convert. 
18 I would submit, Your Honor, t ha i based upon the evidence that we 
19 have presented and the undisputed facts which are undisputed, that 
20 there is only one course and that is that the court grant the Motion 
21 fo r Summary Judgment. On tha t , I don' t have anything else I can say 
22 since I have no opposit ion to the motion so I can ' t respond to any 
23 disputed facts that the p l a i n t i f f may c la im. 
24 THE COURT: Ms. Jones. 
25 MS. JONES: I am a f r a i d , Your Honor, t h a t I am somewhat 
1 confused on this issue. We in essence must have, I frankly 
2 probably misinterpreted what counsel for the plaintiff or for the 
3 defendants were attempting to do. 
4 I have no objection to the Motion to Convert to a Summary 
5 Judgment, but I would, was unaware thai there was additional 
6 evidence or objection necessary to the Summary Judgment a part from our 
7 objections to their Motion to Dismiss. I think that the facts are there 
8 i n the record. 
9 Contrary to what counsel for the defendants' has argued, there is 
10 specific disputed evidence in the record as to Points 4 on their page, 
11 Paragraph 4 on Page 4. They argue that Mesa Vista took over the operatiorj 
12 of this on April the 1st of 1992. The particular specific sublease and 
13 agreement that they signed is undated but it is signed. It is a 
14 March date. I have inclination that was signed on or around the 17th 
15 or 18th of March. My client's cause of action arose on or around the 
16 23rd between in a period between the 18th and the 23rd of March. 
17 They argue in Paragraph 5 that prior to April the 1st of 1992 that 
18 Mesa Vista was not the owner/operator and had no right of entry on the 
19 facility. 
20 There again, we would dispute that. This was a turnkey 
21 operation. The paperwork was signed on March the 17th or 18th to the 
22 best of my available knowledge. On that basis, these were the responsibly 
23 parties. 
24 In any case, the sublease the terms of the agreement and sublease, 
25 Your Homr, sets forth an acceptance of responsibility for all pending 
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and threatened litigation and future responsibility for all debts of 
Lakecrest or the prior owners and operators of the facility which 
even given the dispute over the dates means that the defendants Mesa 
Vista Inc., has accepted a specific right of responsibility to all 
creditors under that agreement. 
As per Paragraph No. 7 and their argument that Ms. Allred is 
misplaced. Ms. Allred, at all times, from sometime prior to October 
or November,as I recall of 1991, was the acting administrator both of 
Lakecrest and of Mesa Vista. She was also one of the main principal 
parties involved in the proposal to purchase from vali Division 
of Wasatch or sublease from Vali Division of Wasatch, however, you 
want to term that contract , as to make the arrangements and take over th£ 
responsibility in terms of Mesa Vista. 
At all times, she was acting as the administrator. It is her 
specific actions against my client>regardl ess of what corporate or 
legal authority was behind her, that one of the actions ensued in this 
matter. 
The standard in any case for a Motion for Summary Judgment is that 
there is no possible view of the facts that can support a judgment 
for my client . I do not think that scandard is met in any case in this 
matter. 
I think that given there is a possibility both as a third party 
beneficiary and as the direct responsible party in terms of Mesa 
Vista, there is no question that Ms. Allred was the administrator, chiejf 
executive and administrator of the facility during all the period in 
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question. Therefore, I think their Motion for Summary Judgment 
should be denied at this point. 
THE COURT: What evidence do you have with regard to your 
allegations that the defendant Mesa Vista actually took over under a 
sublease in March of 1992? 
MS. JONES: The sublease in our motion our opposition to their 
Motion to Dismiss, Your Honor, I think it is attached at "B" in the 
back the specific liability. 
In addition, under the terms of that sublease, Ms. Allred and this 
is also attached to appendix "B'\ Ms. Allred applied for agency action 
beginning on March the 18th of 1992. 
THE COURT: Tell me where it is you are making reference to 
and you are in Exhibit "B"? 
MS. JONES: Exhibit r'B". 
THE COURT: I have got Exhibit "Bn. What part of Exhibit "B"? 
MS. JONES: It is Exhibit nB,!, Appendix "B,:, Exhibit No. 7. 
THE COURT: Agreement of sublease? 
MS. JONES: Yes and then behind that is the next document 
in that file is request for agency action, licensed application of Ms. 
Allred. That application was filed under the terms of this contract 
and was condition subsequent an inability to obtain that contract, Your 
Honor, or that approval , licensing approval was not a condition 
precedent to the sublease agreement. It was a condition subsequent. 
It would have resulted , the inability would have resulted in default, 
but as it was a turnkey operation, the agreement in sublease essentially 
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turned over a l l r espons ib i l i t y and l i a b i l i t y to tne company, Mesa V is ta . 
I would c a l l , Your Honor's a t ten t ion s p e c i f i c a l l y to Paragraph 3,^ - -
THE COURT : Are you ta l k i ng about the agreement in sublease. 
MS. JONES: Yes,the agreement i n sublease. Paragraph 8 
indicates that obtain ing l icens ing was a condi t ion subsequently that 
would nave resulted in defaul t under the agreement but i t was not a 
condi t ion precedent to the sublease arrangement. 
THE COURT: Anything fur ther? 
MS. JONES: What? 
THE COURT: Anything further? 
MS. JONES: Your Honor, it is the plaintiff's position tnat 
while tne defendants' arguments may necessitate an amendment as I stated 
before adding Vali Division of Wasatch as a party, that there 
are sufficient grounds, in this sublease arrangement, okay, and the 
questions as specifically one when they took over.Their argument was 
April the 1st. I think that is a factual issue that requires more then 
a statement in support. This contract although undated has a March 
date on it. Jt is our position that was signed on or around the 
17th or 18th of March which would make them specifically liable 
for action taken against my client. 
In any case, this is a technical dispute that should better be 
remedied with an amendment rather than Summary Judgment, the granting 
of Summary Judgment on their behalf at this point. Thank you. 
THE COURT: Mr. Shell . 
MR. SHELL: Thank you, Your Honor. Again with the agreement 
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in sublease, Your Honor, the State of Utah to operate an ICFMR you have 
to be licensed by the State of Utah . That sublease agreement doesn't 
authorize my client to operate an ICFMR. Only the state through 
licensure can do that. There is no dispute, by the plaintiff, as to the 
facts relating to licensure. That the license was not received until 
the 30th of March and Mesa Vista took over April the 1st. 
Vali Division of Wasatch and Mesa Vista could not agree that 
we don't need to be licensed. The state requires such licensure. 
The second thing that I would like to point out about the 
terms of that subleasing agreement. If the paragraph that they are 
relying on our client taking over liabilities, is what they want to 
rely on for liability, they need to sue Vali • Then Vali can seek 
indemnification from us. That does not create a right of action 
in Sue Ellen Watters against my client. 
I also have responded to that specific- -
THE COURT: Is your client Mesa Vista? 
MR. SHELL: Yes, Your Honor. That creates a cause of action 
maybe Valley against us if they get sued. Again the whole thrust of 
our motion is they sued the wrong people. 
There is a letter in there from a Dr. Cady which the plaintiffs have 
given to the court. Dr. Cady says that well Sue Watters said that my 
claim is against Rocky Mountain Health Care. Now that is a party 
admission. That is their exhibit. They ^now that they should have sued 
Rocky Mountain and they should have sued Vali > but they didn't for som£ 
reason. We don't know why they were testing the case on that basis. 
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1 The standard that was announced for Summary Judgment is not that 
2 by the p l a i n t i f f . The standard i s , is there a material issue of fac t 
3 in dispute and are we e n t i t l e d to judgment as a matter of law. The 
4 material issues of fac t are not in d ispute. 
5 The court can review what we have submitted to the cour t . There is no 
6 question about l icensure and when we were l icensed we have given that tc| 
7 the cour t . There is no question that Sue El len Watte^s was never an 
8 employee of Mesa V is ta . That is a material issue of fact tha t we 
9 have raised and put i t in our declarat ion and they d i d n ' t dispute t ha t . 
10 They don' t dispute that she has never , the p l a i n t i f f , w a s never an 
11 employee of Mesa V is ta . That is very t e l l i n g . They don' t dispute 
12 that she never received a paycheck, even a separation paycheck from Mesa 
13 V is ta . A l l of that was done wi th Val i and Lakecrest and Rocky 
14 Mountaiii , not Mesa V is ta . They don' t dispute any of t h a t . 
15 Now i f I could go to that one paragraph on the terms of the 
16 sublease dealing wi th us taking over the l i a b i l i t i e s . We have quoted 
17 j for the court the language that is essen t ia l . We never agreed to take 
18 over every and a l l l i a b i l i t i e s . This is a case, we agreed to take over 
19 pending or threatened l i t i g a t i o n . When we took over on Apr i l the 1st 
20 of 1992, th is case was not pending. This case was not threatened. 
21 I would submit tha t even i f the court wanted to f i nd that maybe 
22 we should stay in the case fo r the purposes of whatever, tha t language 
23 would not cover us. This case, J don' t be l ieve, was f i l e d un t i l March 
24 or Apr i l of 1993, long a f te r that agreement became e f f e c t i v e . So we 
25 wouldn ' t , even on the
 f a c e 0 f i t , we cou ldn ' t be covered by tha t . 
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I would submit, Your Honor, that there is no amendment that car. cure 
this. That if she wanted to object to the Motion for Summary 
Judgment, she had a procedural remedy set out in the various rules which 
was to tell us her legal and factual basis for disputing it. She hasn't 
done that, and she hasn't done it again today. 
I would submit that the motion needs to be granted. 
THE COURT: Let me ask you a question. Is Karen All red 
associated with Val i , Lakecrest or Rocky Mountain in any fashion? 
MR. SHELL: No, Your Honor. In fact, the most that she 
ever was , was an employee of Val i Division of Wasatch. Actually, 
it is difficult to determine who she was employed by. I believe she 
was employed by Lakecrest Developmental Center which was operated by 
Rocky Mountain Health Care which in turn was owned by Vali Division 
of Wasatch. She was never anything other than an employee. In fact 
that is in her declaration. Mesa Vista has never been affiliated in 
anyway, shape or form with any of those other three organizations. 
THE COURT: What was her position as an employee with Vali? 
MR. SHELL: I believe in October the 1st of 1991, she was 
hired as the acting administrator. She operated as the administrator 
up through and including March 30th of 1992. Beginning April the 1st of 
1992, she was employed as the administrator for Mesa Vista Inc. 
THE COURT: Well, basically she was the administrator for 
Vali acting or otherwise? 
MR. SHELL: Correct. But her acts then on a Respondeat Superi 
Theory would just make Vali liable for whatever actions she took but 
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not Mesa Vista. 
Then again, Your Honor, the wrong parties have been brought before 
the court. Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Ms. Jones. 
MS. JONES: I think there is an affidavit also in that attachment 
"B" , Your Honor. Counsel for the defendants have argued that this was 
not pending or threatened litigation. I think that negotiations 
between our offices and the office of local counsel here, Mr. Blatter 
in early April, very shortly after my client was terminated. 
THE COURT: Well, by April the 1st that is when they apparently] 
took over. 
MS. JONES: It was after April 1st that such negotiation began 
THE COURT: It would seem it wasn't pending or threatened. 
MS. JONES: It depends on when the cause of action arose. If 
the cause of action arose, it seems to me on between the 18th and 23rd 
of March than then it would become threatened or pending litigation 
once that cause of action arose. 
THE COURT: I think when we talk "pending" or "threatened" 
we are talking about what is pending or tnreatened as of the date 
of the agreement. There has to be actual knowledge of that not something| 
that comes down the road later. Just that language alone, you nave 
to nave actual knowledge otherwise you have nr> meeting of the mind at 
all to a contract. If it is not pending or threatening on April the 
1st, then I don't see how Mesa Vista could be a part of this lawsuit. 
MS. JONES: Okay. 
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THE COURT: My concern is about Karen A l l r e d . However, 
I am not necessa r i l y i n c l i n e d to g ran t a Summary Judgment aga ins t 
Karen A l l r e d . 
MS. JONES: Your Honor, i f you want to g ran t aga ins t her 
a d i s m i s s a l - -
THE COURT: Pardon. 
MS. JONES: I f you want to g ran t aga ins t her a v o l u n t a r y 
d ismissa l and i f they w i l l accept s e r v i c e , J w i l l amend our compla in t 
aga ins t Va l i D i v i s i o n o f Wasatch. 
THE COURT 
MS. JONES 
MR. SHELL 
MS. JONES 
MR. SHELL 
Don ' t know i f they represent Va l i ? 
They won ' t but they rep resen t Karen. 
We w i l l accept a v o l u n t a r y d i s m i s s a l . 
Tne question is w i l l you accept service of the su i t 
She is dismissed. Maybe I am misunderstanding, 
Your Honor. 
MS. JONES: Never mind. I won't do t ha t . 
THE COURT: Wel l , ] want to get your arguments with regard 
to Karen A l l red why I should grant a Motion fo r Summary Judgment as to 
Karen A l l r e d . Spec i f i ca l l y , I think i t is f a i r l y c lear and I w i l l grant 
the Motion fo r Summary Judgment against Mesa Vista Inc. 
As to Karen A l l r e d , you have e n t i t l e d your complaint or amended 
complaint Karen A l l red Executive Di rector . I f your posi t ion is that 
we are suing Karen A l l red as Executive Director of Mesa Vista then I 
suspect that I should grant the Motion for Summary Judgment. However, 
I wouldn't want this Motion fo r Summary Judgment to be argued that you do 
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not have a cause of action against Karen Allred, the acting administrator 
of Vali , if that happens to be another lawsuit you want to file. If 
you think that you served Karen All red as Executive Director of Mesa 
Vista,then I should probably grant the Motion for Summary Judgment - -
MS. JONES: We have served her personally, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: - - against all parties. 
MS. JONES: We have served her in person and not specifically 
in her capacity as Executive Director. 
THE COURT: Well, I am just looking at the heading of your 
amended complaint, you just list her as Executive Director. Go back 
and look at your amended complaint and see whether or not you mentioned 
that you served her personally. 
MR. SHELL: I believe the court is correct. She was served 
in her capacity, well she was sued in her capacity as Executive 
Director and Administrator of Mesa Vista. 
THE COURT: Well, in looking at Paragraphs 12 and 13 the 
ownership of Lakecrest Center including the Rehabilitation Center was 
transferred to Karen All red. I assume that is totally inaccurate? 
MR. SHELL: I am sorry, Your Honor, which one are you looking 
at? 
THE COURT: I am just looking at her amended complaint , 
at Ms. Jones' amended complaint Paragraph 12 says that in February 
of 1992 the ownership of Lakecrest Center including the Rehabilitation 
Center. 
MS. JONES: Your Honor, 1 think that is probably a misstatement! 
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of the actual legal f a c t s . I do not think i t is a misstatement of the 
facts as represented e i t he r by Ms. A l l red in her numerous capac i t ies . 
Legally she was not. 
THE COURT: What I am going to do. I am going to grant 
the Motion f o r Summary Judgment against Mesa Vista .and as against 
Karen A l l r ed as Executive Di rector of Mesa Vista and that w i l l leave you 
free to bring your lawsuit again against Karen A l l red as'an act ing 
administrator and get the proper part ies before the court . 
MS. JONES: Okay. 
MR. SHELL: Thank you, Your Honor. Would you like me to 
prepare the order for the court? 
THE COURT: Pardon me. 
MR. SHELL: Would you like me to prepare the order for the 
court? 
THE COURT: Yes, please and submit it to Ms. Jones for 
approval as to form before you submit it to the court for signature. 
MR. SHELL: Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. If nothing further court will be 
in recess. 
THE BAILIFF: Everyone please arise. Court will be in recess. 
(WHEREUPON, this matter was concluded) 
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1 I C E R T I F I C A T E 
2 
3 
4 
5 I STATE OF UTAH ) 
s s . 
6 | COUNTY OF WASATCH ) 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 I THIS IS TO CERTIFY that the HEARING was reported by me in 
12 Stenotype, and thereafter caused by me to be transcribed into 
13 typewriting by Richard C. Tatton and that a full, true and correct 
14 transcription of said HEARING was so taken. 
15 J FURTHER CERTIFY that I am not of kin or otherwise 
16 associated with any of the parties to said cause of action and that 
17 j am not interested in the event thereof. 
18 I WITNESS my hand and official eal at Midway, Utah, this 
1 9
 | rl % day of February, 1994. 
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21 
22 
23 . 
M.y commission e x p i r e s : 
2 4
 ' June 15, 1997 
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